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Abstract 
In this paper, I talk about Section 965, also known as the transition tax, enacted in the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). First, I examine loopholes under the old tax regime that 
allowed for the accumulation of offshore earnings and how the TCJA closes those 
loopholes. After detailing the legislation of the transition tax and a comparison with 
Section 965 included in the American Jobs Creation Act in 2004, I compare firms’ 
recorded provisions of the transition tax with an estimation based on the past 
disclosures of firms’ permanently reinvested earnings and finds that the transition tax 
will generate an estimated $308 billion in tax revenue. Lastly, I propose three alternate 
scenarios to the transition tax: taxing all offshore earnings under the GILTI regime, 
treating offshore cash as eligible for the 21% corporate rate, and a ratable payment plan 
compared to the current phase-in payment plan.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) was signed into law in December 2017 and was 
the largest tax reform since 1986. The TCJA changed the ways that the U.S. 
government taxes international earnings in an effort to fix loopholes in the old 
international tax regime. This overhaul of international tax law gave rise to Section 
965, also known as the transition tax, which taxes international earnings that have 
never been repatriated to the U.S. Prior to Section 965, firms had been able to avoid 
paying U.S. income tax on substantial amounts of earnings. This paper will discuss the 
issues that created profit-shifting loopholes under the old international tax regime and 
how the new regime addresses those issues. Then, there will be an analysis of the 
transition tax legislation and how firms calculate their transition tax liability, a 
comparison with the 2004 Section 965 repatriation tax, and a transition tax projection 
for the firms that hold the most substantial amounts of offshore earnings that escaped 
U.S. income tax since 1986. Finally, there will be an analysis of alternative scenarios to 
the transition tax and a comparison of projected transition tax revenues from the 
same sample with these alternative scenarios. 
Section 2 describes several issues within the old tax regime that allowed firms to 
shift their profits overseas in order to avoid paying U.S. income tax at the previous 35 
percent corporate tax rate. Loose corporate residence definitions in the US and 
several low-tax foreign jurisdictions allowed firms to set up subsidiaries in foreign 
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countries, resulting in an exemption from both U.S. and foreign income taxes. To 
capitalize on this loophole, major firms sold the intellectual rights of their intangible 
assets to their foreign subsidiaries, which under the old U.S. tax law allowed the 
foreign subsidiaries to claim the revenues generated from those intangible assets, and 
therefore avoided paying income taxes. Legislation enacted in 1997 created the check-
the-box method, which opened up a major loophole in the Controlled Foreign 
Corporation (CFC) regime and allowed for firms to sidestep Subpart F taxation.  
The TCJA tries to limit future profit shifting by creating new international tax 
regimes including the Foreign Derived Intangible Income (FDII) regime, the Global 
Intangible Low Tax Income (GILTI) regime, and the Base Erosion and Antiabuse Tax 
(BEAT) regime. The FDII regime creates incentives for firms to keep intangible assets in 
the U.S. Previously, moving intangible assets offshore had been a key component of 
firms’ profit shifting strategies. The GILTI regime is designed to capture foreign 
earnings that had previously escaped Subpart F earnings due to the check-the-box 
regime. The BEAT regime imposes a tax liability for U.S. corporations that make 
payments to foreign subsidiaries of the U.S. corporation in an effort to prevent 
intercompany transactions that had been crucial in profit shifting strategies. 
Section 3 compares Section 965 of the TCJA with Section 965 released in the 
American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) in 2004. The legislation behind the current Section 
965 is intricate but can be summarized as two rates imposed on all permanently 
reinvested earnings (PRE) since 1986: 15.5 percent on cash and cash equivalents and 
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eight percent on noncash assets. Firms have to report all of their PRE on the following 
year’s tax return, but the firms do not have to bring these assets back to the US. The 
transition tax also stipulates a non-ratable payment plan for firms to pay off their 
liability in eight years. Through the use of several notices throughout the past year, 
the IRS has helped clarify important measurement due dates, cash equivalent asset 
definitions, and other rules that are necessary for firms as they calculate their total 
transition tax liability. The Section 965 repatriation tax in 2004 is a stark contrast to 
the TCJA transition tax, as the 2004 version was a voluntary, one-time deduction on all 
foreign earnings repatriated to the US and lowered the effective tax rate on the 
foreign earnings to approximately 5.25 percent. The 2004 repatriation tax also 
restricted the ways in which firms used the repatriated funds and led to an increase in 
share repurchases within the firms who elected to repatriate their offshore earnings.  
The first analysis compares the actual transition tax provision from firms with 
greater than $10 billion of PRE with an estimated provision using PRE and foreign cash 
listed on their recent 10-K financial statements. It takes the total PRE in 2017, for 
some of the firms in the sample, their most recent disclosure of PRE was in 2016 and 
for those firms total PRE is their 2016 PRE combined with pre-tax foreign earnings of 
2017, and breaks the total PRE into two categories: cash and noncash. The majority of 
the firms in the sample disclosed their cash and cash equivalents held in offshore 
subsidiaries and this disclosed total is the assumed amount of total cash eligible for 
the 15.5 percent rate for the transition tax. The total noncash asset amount was 
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calculated by subtracting foreign cash from total PRE. The 15.5 percent and eight 
percent rates were applied to foreign cash and foreign noncash assets, respectively, in 
order to generate a projected transition tax liability. This estimation was compared to 
the actual transition tax provisions listed on the firms’ 2017 financial statements. The 
average effective tax rate based off of the transition tax provisions listed by the firms 
was 9.3 percent, which translates to an estimated $173 billion in tax revenue 
generated from the transition tax from the selected firms. This $173 billion would be a 
significant revenue source for the government, and while it gives firms an extremely 
low effective tax rate, the transition tax allows the government to collect taxes on 
earnings that may have never been repatriated to the U.S. under the previous law. 
Section 4 lays out three alternatives to the transition tax. The first scenario is a 
complete removal of the transition tax and taxes all PRE under the GILTI regime. This 
analysis was calculated by taking the firms’ pretax foreign income dating back to 1986, 
subtracting the deemed ten percent return on foreign long-lived assets – in this 
scenario foreign PPE disclosed in 2017 was held constant back to 1986 – and applying 
the 10.5 percent rate on the difference per year. The total pretax foreign income was 
reduced for most firms under the assumption that any amount of total post-1986 
pretax foreign income in excess of total PRE indicates that the firms repatriated that 
difference to the U.S. This excess amount is excluded because if the firm repatriated 
these funds, they would have already paid U.S. income tax on these amounts, which 
excludes these amounts from the GILTI regime. Taxing PRE under the GILTI regime 
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drops the projected tax revenues from these firms by 62.7 percent when compared to 
the Section 965 legislation. This scenario would be impractical for implementation, as 
it would be difficult for firms to calculate exact totals of foreign earnings and long-
lived assets for each year dating back to 1986. 
The second scenario keeps the transition tax in place but raises the rate on cash 
and cash equivalents to 21 percent. The rationale behind the increased cash rate lies 
under the assumption that firms with substantial amounts of foreign cash will take 
advantage of the transition tax to bring the cash back to the US. This 21 percent tax 
rate would be equivalent to how much the firms would pay on similar earnings 
generated within the U.S., compared to the 35 percent rate under which the earnings 
were eligible to be taxed had they been repatriated to the U.S. This scenario raises the 
effective tax rate on total PRE to 13 percent and increases projected tax revenues by 
$32 billion. While a material boost in revenue, this raised cash rate could place 
financial strain on firms with large amounts of offshore cash. This would be at odds 
with the overarching goal of the TCJA to bring investments and jobs back to the U.S. in 
order to stimulate the economy.  
The final scenario looks at the transition tax payment plan allowed under Section 
965, which every firm in the sample elected to use. The payment plan states that 8 
percent of the net transition tax liability is owed each year for the first five years, 
followed by 15 percent, 20 percent, and 25 percent in years six, seven, and eight, 
respectively. This approach is known as phase-in legislation, and the low rates in the 
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near future allow for future legislation to extend the payment plan or even eliminate 
the liability altogether. This payment plan lowers the net present value of the total 
estimated transition tax liability of these firms from $173 billion to $150 billion. An 
alternative to this phase-in payment plan would be to ratably spread the liability over 
an eight-year period, where 12.5 percent of the net liability is due each year. Under 
this scenario, the present value increases from $150 billion to $154 billion, or a rough 
two percent increase in present value. This theoretical ratable payment plan may not 
have been elected due to lobbying from the firms most impacted by the transition tax, 
or Congress may have believed that the 4.5 percent increase per year for the first five 
years could have placed financial strain on these firms.  
This paper is limited in its scope, as the numbers pulled does not give a complete 
sense of what these firms hold in their total PRE between cash and noncash assets, 
and does not consider the possible offsetting effects of tax credits allowed under the 
current legislation. This paper is intended to give a detailed discussion on a significant 
aspect of the new tax code that is frequently overlooked because it is a one-time tax 
on past earnings. The transition tax will have a material impact on government 
revenue in the near future, and this paper can help introduce the subject to anyone 
that is unfamiliar to such a significant source of revenue under the TCJA. The analysis 
conducted on firms’ prior disclosures to calculate an estimated transition tax liability 
found that the transition tax will generate an estimated $308 billion. Yet the Joint 
Committee on Taxation estimated that this transition tax would generate $338.8 
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billion in revenue. This significant gap of about $30 billion could indicate that firms are 
using significant amounts of foreign tax credits to reduce their liability, or that firms 
are finding new loopholes within the transition tax. 
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2. A COMPARISON OF THE OLD TAX REGIME WITH THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT 
(TCJA) 
2.1 The Old Regime: Significant Flaws With Regards to Foreign Earning Repatriation 
Large multinational corporations (MNC’s) were able to avoid paying taxes by 
shifting their earnings offshore, then permanently reinvesting these foreign earnings. 
By the end of 2016, Fortune 500 companies had an estimated $2.6 trillion of 
permanently reinvested earnings in foreign countries (ITEP, 2017). These MNC’s were 
able to avoid the 35 percent US tax rate through loopholes created in the U.S. tax 
legislation. Some of the largest loopholes include: 
a. Loose corporate residence definitions; 
b. Rules regarding transfer pricing and profit sharing; 
c. Issues with the CFC regime; 
d.  Check-the-box regulations. 
2.1a Corporate Residence Definition Variability  
The United States Internal Revenue Code §7701(a)(5) states that a foreign 
corporation is a corporation created or organized in a jurisdiction other than the 
United States. 26 US Code §861(a) and §245(b) state that an MNC headquartered in 
the U.S. that owns a foreign corporation did not have to pay income taxes on the 
foreign corporation’s income until the foreign corporation repatriated its net income 
as a dividend to its parent corporation in the United States. This single factor 
residence definition allows a U.S.-based MNC to create a subsidiary in a foreign 
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country and avoid paying U.S. income tax on that subsidiary’s income until it decides 
to repatriate the income. 
Setting up a subsidiary in a low-tax foreign jurisdiction was the first step for 
MNCs to shift their profits abroad. Next, MNCs sold intangibles developed in the US to 
their wholly owned foreign subsidiaries (Levin, 2012). Under the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Code (IRC), the subsidiary must pay for these assets at an “arm’s length” price, but 
since these intangibles were developed internally by the MNC, it was extremely 
difficult to determine what a third-party purchaser should pay for the assets (Levin, 
2013).  The U.S. parent corporation would then set the prices artificially low, which 
would minimize its U.S. taxable income from the sale of the intangible assets.  
When MNCs sold their intangibles outright, the foreign subsidiary would owe 
royalties to the parent corporation in the U.S. To avoid this, MNCs set up a cost 
sharing agreement with the foreign subsidiary (Levin, 2013). These cost sharing 
agreements were designed to limit the amount of revenue generated in the U.S. that 
would be eligible for U.S. taxation. A typical cost sharing agreement consisted of a U.S. 
parent and one or more of its wholly owned foreign subsidiaries designating a 
percentage of R&D costs to each party. The portion of these R&D costs performed 
within the U.S. significantly outweighed the percentage designated to the U.S. parent. 
This would allow U.S. parent corporations to write off the R&D expenditures in the 
U.S. for a greater tax benefit, but the profits would be recognized in low-tax foreign 
jurisdictions. For example, a U.S. parent corporation and its foreign subsidiary could 
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agree on a 50-50 split. This would imply that the subsidiary would contribute 50 
percent of the development costs of the intellectual property, which would be funded 
by the U.S. parent. These funds now held by the foreign subsidiary would then be paid 
back to the U.S. parent as development costs (Ting, 2014). This arrangement would 
allow the subsidiary to claim 50 percent of the profits that were attributed to the 
intellectual property. This two-part strategy was the most common tax planning 
method for MNCs to avoid or delay paying U.S. income tax. 
2.1b Complications with the CFC Regime 
In order to prevent MNCs from deferring revenue, the U.S. created the 
controlled foreign corporation (CFC) regime in 1962, defined in IRC §951-965.  The CFC 
regime was designed to limit the tax deferral on Subpart F income, which includes 
royalties, interest, and dividend income, by imposing immediate taxation on passive 
income. An exception called the “manufacturing exception” was included, which 
states that a CFC can avoid immediate taxation if substantial value is added to the 
goods (McCain, 2013). This exception was included presumably to prevent the CFC 
regime from discouraging MNCs’ international manufacturing expansion. However, as 
mentioned above, it is difficult for outside parties to determine what value should be 
assigned fairly to R&D projects or intellectual property. This loophole was exploited by 
MNCs until 1997 with the creation of the check-the-box regime, which opened the 
door for even more profit shifting abroad. 
2.1c “Check-the-box” regulations sidestepping Subpart F 
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MNCs were limited in their U.S. income tax deferral of their offshore business 
activity with the establishment of Subpart F in 1986. Subpart F states that companies 
are not allowed to defer income tax for passive income listed above in section 2.1a, 
which was the type of income that MNCs were avoiding paying U.S. income tax on. 
However, the political context of 1997 led to the creation of the check-the-box regime 
under the Treasury Regulations §301, which formed a major loophole for MNCs. This 
new regime allowed business enterprises to choose which type of legal entity they 
wanted to be for U.S. federal tax purposes (Levin, 2012). MNC subsidiaries became 
hybrid entities, meaning that under foreign tax law the subsidiary is a separate entity, 
but a pass-through entity for U.S. tax purposes (OECD Publishing, 2013). MNCs used 
the check-the-box regime to sidestep Subpart F taxation in intricate ways, as 
illustrated by the following example. In this example, an MNC with the name “Parent” 
creates and incorporates a subsidiary named “Sub 1” in a low-tax foreign country. 
Parent and Sub 1 would enter into a cost-sharing agreement that transferred the 
intellectual rights of intangible assets to Sub 1. Sub 1 would then create and 
incorporate their own subsidiaries, “Sub 2” and “Sub 3”, in other low-tax foreign 
jurisdictions, with Sub 3 being the primary vendor of products to customers and the 
collector of sales revenue. Sub 3 would accomplish this by paying royalties to Sub 1 for 
the use of the intellectual property held by Sub 1, and Sub 2 would act as the 
intermediary between Sub 1 and Sub 3, and aid in the marketing the product. Subs 1, 
2, and 3 would then engage in intra-company transactions that involved a transfer of 
products and revenues that would qualify them for the CFC regime. The sales income 
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earned by Sub 3 would be distributed back to Sub 1 through Sub 2, since Sub 1 had the 
intellectual rights and Sub 2 aided in the marketing strategy. That income would be 
eligible for Subpart F as a type of passive income. The Parent would be forced to 
report the revenues and transactions on their income tax statements. However, with 
the check-the-box regime, Subs 2 and 3 would elect themselves as passthrough 
entities. Under U.S. tax law, this choice would effectively make Subs 2 and 3 
transparent, and all intra-company transactions that were occurring between the 
three subsidiaries would seem to be solely occurring within Sub 1. The sales income 
earned from Sub 3 would then be classified as sales income directly earned by Sub 1 
under an exception known as the active business exception.1 By appearing to be 
earned directly under Sub 1, the sales income is no longer eligible for Subpart F, and 
through this strategy foreign subsidiaries were able to engage in intra-company 
transactions without triggering the CFC regime for their parent corporation (Ting, 
2014).  
2.1d How Corporations Took Advantage of these Flaws 
 Large MNCs used every loophole given to them under the old regime in order to 
lower their U.S. income tax liability. First, the MNCs would establish subsidiaries and 
                                                             
1 The active business exception under Section 954(c)(1)(A) states that if a CFC acquires the intangible 
property and actively engages in marketing and servicing, the income earned from royalties would not be 
eligible for Subpart F. In this example, Sub 2 would be engaging in marketing and servicing in order to sell 
the product and would have paid royalties to Sub 1 to sell products using the intellectual rights held by 
Sub 1. Yet with Check-the-box, for U.S. tax purposes it appears that Sub 1 not only holds the intellectual 
rights, but actively markets for the sale of the products, which is how this regime enabled firms to 
sidestep Subpart F. 
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incorporate them in countries with favorable tax laws, such as Ireland. Ireland’s 
corporate residence definition is single factor, like the United States, but their factor 
stipulates that any corporation within Ireland that is owned or managed by a foreign 
corporation is not subject to Irish income tax (Ting, 2014). Firms like Microsoft and 
Apple set up their subsidiaries in Ireland in order to take advantage of the double non-
taxation created between Ireland and the U.S.  
 For firms to capitalize on the double non-taxation, they had to sell intangible 
assets to their newly-established foreign subsidiaries, usually in the form of cost 
sharing agreements as mentioned above. A more practical example including both 
profit shifting and the sale of intangibles to a foreign subsidiary involves Microsoft U.S. 
and Microsoft Puerto Rico in 2011. Microsoft U.S. sold the rights to its intellectual 
property to Microsoft Puerto Rico (Levin, 2012). Microsoft U.S. would then buy back 
the distribution rights from Microsoft Puerto Rico, and then also buy a portion of the 
intellectual rights back. The specific agreement allowed for 47 percent of Microsoft’s 
U.S. sales to be shifted to Puerto Rico, which meant that in 2011 Microsoft avoided 
paying U.S. income taxes on 47 cents for every dollar of sales made in the U.S., a total 
of $4.5 billion in tax savings (Levin, 2012). By selling back a portion of the intellectual 
rights, Microsoft Puerto Rico avoided paying Microsoft U.S. royalties for their 
intellectual property.  
When Congress passed the check-the-box regime in 1997, the regime change 
allowed MNCs to change the tax status of the subsidiaries of their foreign subsidiaries 
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to pass-through entities. As mentioned above, the intra-company transactions subject 
to CFC taxation made between foreign subsidiaries and its own subsidiaries no longer 
appeared to be intra-company transactions and instead were just within a single 
foreign subsidiary. This allowed for MNCs to engage in intra-company transactions 
that would shift profits through multiple foreign countries without qualifying for the 
CFC regime’s immediate taxation. From years 2009-2011, the firms Apple, Google, and 
Microsoft were able to defer taxes on $35.4 billion, $24.2 billion, and $21 billion, 
respectively (Levin, 2012).  
2.2 How the TCJA Addresses Foreign Revenue Repatriation 
The old regime of U.S. international taxation was frequently used by 
corporations to lower their effective income tax rate. Congress was aware of the need 
for change within the TCJA. However, the closing of past loopholes opens the 
possibility for new ones to arise. Some important areas to focus on when looking at 
how the TCJA impacts international tax planning include: 
a. Effects on profit shifting; 
b. Foreign Derived Intangible Income (FDII) regime; 
c. The Global Intangible Low Tax Income (GILTI) regime; 
d. The Base Erosion and Antiabuse (BEAT) regime. 
2.2a How the TCJA targets profit shifting 
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The strategies employed by MNCs to shift their profits are well-known to 
Congress, as shown in its Budget and Economic Outlook: 2018 to 2028 (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2018). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) groups the various forms 
of profit shifting into three categories, two of them being the artificially low transfer 
prices and low-taxed foreign corporate residency mentioned in Section (2)(a) 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2018). The CBO also projects that with the 
implementation of the TCJA, profit shifting will be reduced by $65 billion per year, on 
average, for the next eleven years. Conversely, later in the report the CBO states that 
roughly 80 percent of the current profit shifting will still occur, due to changes enacted 
by the TCJA (Congressional Budget Office, 2018). Because of issues that the CBO does 
not account for, such as investor reactions to the instability of the FDII regime 
(addressed in the next section) as well as the vulnerability of the legislation as a 
whole, the TCJA’s limiting effect on profit shifting may be even smaller than 
forecasted. 
2.2b The FDII Regime  
 The FDII regime was drafted to keep intangible assets in the U.S. by using a lower 
tax rate as an incentive, rather than shifting the intangibles abroad. FDII is generally 
income generated from export sales or services. The exchange, license, lease, sale or 
other disposition of property sold by a U.S. taxpayer to a non-U.S. entity for foreign 
use, or services provided by a U.S. taxpayer to any person or entity not located in the 
U.S., are two examples of FDII. The provision itself is a deduction, with §250 (a)(1) 
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stating that the taxpayer can deduct 37.5 percent of FDII, which leaves the remaining 
62.5 percent subject to normal corporate taxation at the 21 percent rate. This lowers 
the effective tax rate to 13.125 percent. The provision is effective immediately and 
does not sunset. However, from 2026 onwards the deduction is reduced to 21.875 
percent, raising the effective tax rate on FDII to 16.41 percent. This deduction is 
available only to domestic C-corporations.2  
 The FDII regime targets MNCs who shift income from activity within the U.S. to 
abroad. When defining FDII, the Joint Committee on Taxation states, “Deduction for 
foreign-derived intangible income derived from trade or business within the United 
States [emphasis added]” (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2018). The provision tries to 
create an incentive for MNCs to shift intangible property back to the U.S. by 
eliminating “foreign branch income” from FDII deduction, as stipulated in 
§250(b)(3)(A)(VI). This “foreign branch income, which is introduced by the TCJA, is 
composed of business profits from “qualified business units in 1 or more foreign 
countries”.3 In order to receive the deduction, the business must move the work to 
                                                             
2Domestic implies incorporation in the U.S. as defined in §7701 (a)(4). This deduction is not extended to 
subchapter S-corporations, as stated, “An S corporation’s taxable income is computed in the same 
manner as an individual so that deductions allowable only to corporations, such as FDII and GILTI, do not 
apply”. House Report 115-466, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1, December 
15, 2017. P. 626, 626 fn 1524.  
3 §250(b)(3)(A)(VI) references §904(d)(2)(J) which defines foreign branch income, §904(d)(2)(VI) defines 
foreign branch income with respect to qualified business units. 
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the U.S., rather than abroad. The FDII regime also eliminates the deduction of any 
pass-through income earned by foreign subsidiaries, specifically CFC income.4 
2.2c The GILTI Regime 
 The GILTI regime is also designed to prevent MNCs from shifting profits abroad. 
§250(a)(1) states that this regime is imposed on CFC income, by taxing certain income 
at the regular domestic rate of 21 percent, but then reduces the effective tax rate to 
10.5 percent through a 50 percent deduction. This “certain income” refers to income 
that under pre-TCJA law was the earnings of a CFC that were not subject to Subpart F 
income, and therefore were not subject to U.S. income tax until the CFC distributed 
the income back to the U.S. as a dividend. Also, there is a deemed ten percent return 
on foreign assets that are excluded from the GILTI calculation, leading to additional 
income from being excluded from taxation. This new regime stipulates that U.S. 
taxpayers with at least a 10 percent share of a CFC will be required to list the CFC’s 
GILTI as taxable income regardless of whether the earnings are repatriated to the U.S. 
Theoretically, the motivation behind the GILTI regime was to move tangible assets 
back to the U.S., yet it remains to be seen if this regime will work as desired.  
2.2d The BEAT Regime 
                                                             
4 §957. Domestic corporations are not allowed to deduct any income of a CFC in which the domestic 
corporation is a United States shareholder as defined by §951(b). This includes subpart F income, GILTI, 
and dividends from the CFC. Pulled from Sanchirico, Chris William. “The New US Tax Preference for 
‘Foreign-Derived Intangible Income.’” The New US Tax Preference for "Foreign-Derived Intangible 
Income", 30 Apr. 2018, ssrn.com/abstract=3171091. 
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 The BEAT regime is one of the more intriguing provisions introduced by the TCJA. 
The BEAT legislation applies to all MNCs, regardless of whether they are owned by a 
U.S. or foreign parent. 26 USC §9A imposes tax liability on U.S. corporations that make 
payments to a foreign affiliated company in which the U.S. corporation owns 25 
percent of the company, and the company owns this share to reduce their U.S. tax 
liability. An interesting aspect of the BEAT is a minimum tax based off an expanded tax 
basis titled “modified taxable income”. Modified taxable income does not account for 
tax benefits that stem from “base erosion payments”, or the deductible payments 
made by a U.S. corporation to a foreign affiliate. The minimum tax rate is 10 percent 
and is imposed on the modified taxable income over the taxpayer’s regular tax 
liability.  
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3. SECTION 965: THEN AND NOW 
3.1 Section 965 Under the TCJA 
 Section 965 of the TCJA, more commonly known as the transition tax, allows 
companies to start fresh with regards to the new regimes that the Act puts into place. 
It is written to directly address the large amounts of offshore earnings held by many 
U.S. corporations due to the profit shifting incentives of the old regime, by requiring 
these firms to include any previously-untaxed earnings in their taxable income. After 
the TCJA, the IRS and the Treasury have issued numerous notices in order to clarify 
areas of the legislation.  
3.1a Section 965 at the Time of the TCJA Passing  
The transition tax’s legislation is broken down into 15 sections in order to 
capture firms’ offshore earnings without creating loopholes. §965 states that 
accumulated post-1986 deferred foreign income up until November 2, 2017, or 
December 31, 2017, whichever is greater, for the last taxable year of a deferred 
foreign income corporation (DFIC) before the start of 2018 is eligible for the transition 
tax. This tax affects U.S. shareholders’ pro rata earnings and profits (E&P) that had not 
been previously subject to U.S. taxation of specified foreign corporations (SFC). An SFC 
includes all CFCs and any other foreign corporation-excluding passive foreign 
investment corporations with at least one U.S. corporation that is a U.S. shareholder. 
The tax is imposed with Subpart-F rules, and the tax rate is 15.5 percent for foreign 
earnings deemed to be held in cash and cash equivalents. Any remaining earnings are 
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taxed at eight percent. The provision also stipulates that the taxpayer can elect to pay 
this transition tax over a period of eight years, with eight percent owed year in years 
one through five, 15 percent in year six, 20 percent in year seven, and the final 25 
percent in year eight.  
3.1b Notices Released by the IRS and Treasury Within the Last 12 Months 
 Since the transition tax is intended to encapsulate all post-1986 earnings held 
offshore, the IRS wants to ensure that there is no confusion over the specific definition 
of the terms included in Section 965. There have been a total of three notices issued: 
Notice 2018-07, Notice 2018-13, and Notice 2018-26. The IRS then released REG-
104226-18, which are proposed regulations for Section 965.5 
3.1b (i): Notice 2018-07 
 The first notice issued was Notice 2018-07, released on December 29, 2017. The 
notice lists various regulations that the IRS and Treasury intend to issue (Sites et. al, 
2018). One such regulation clarifies Section 965(b)(5), or the prevention of double 
counting of intercompany cash amounts in order to determine the aggregate foreign 
cash position that is taxed at the 15.5 percent rate. The notice also specifies the 
determination of post-1986 foreign E&P in Section 965(a), and discusses whether cash 
distributions that occur in the same year as the transition tax are included in the E&P 
                                                             
5 REG-104226-18 also proposes reforms for Sections 962 and 986 (c). These regulations will be discussed 
below, but do not significantly alter the overall landscape for the transition tax. Instead, they provide 
examples and extensive rules on the repatriation tax. 
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calculation. Further, the IRS restates that the transition tax would be applicable to 
foreign corporations in the first taxable year under the TCJA.  
3.1b (ii): Notice 2018-13 
 Notice 2018-13 was released exactly three weeks after Notice 2018-07 on 
January 19, 2018. Two of the statements within the notice apply to the rules that 
classify what cash is included in the 15.5 percent rate. The notice states that an SFC’s 
cash position is equal to the combination of cash held by the SFC, net accounts 
receivable of the SFC, and the fair market value of liquid assets. While Section 965 
does not directly define accounts receivable, the IRS issued the definition of accounts 
receivable as the same definition described in Section 1221 (a)(4).  
Not only did the notice spell out further regulations, but it also amended 
statements from the prior notice 2018-07. One of these reclassifications relates to the 
“section 965(a) inclusion amount,” which applies to U.S. shareholders that have less 
than 100 percent ownership of a DFIC. Previously, the inclusion amount referred to 
the total amount of deferred income. This notice clarifies the inclusion amount as the 
amount included in the gross income of the U.S. shareholder with respect to the DFIC. 
In other words, a U.S. shareholder is only responsible for listing its pro rata share of 
the DFIC’s deferred income. The notice also states that if an SFC is classified as a DFIC, 
then it cannot also be an E&P deficit foreign corporation. Furthermore, the IRS 
realized that the inclusion date of November 2, 2017, is impractical for many 
companies since that date does not coincide with a financial close date. So, the IRS 
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created a new way to calculate post-1986 E&P (Sites et. al, 2018b). This new method is 
as follows: the post-1986 of an SFC as of November 2, 2017, will be the foreign 
corporation’s post-1986 E&P as of October 31, 2017, combined with its “annualized 
E&P amount”. This “annualized E&P amount” is equal to two times the amount of 
daily earnings. Daily earnings refers to the post-1986 E&P earned by the SFC in the 
taxable year ending October 31, 2017, divided by the number of days that has passed 
in the taxable year ending October 31, 2017.  
3.1b (iii): Notice 2018-26 
 Notice 2018-26 was the last notice released before the proposed regulations. 
Some of the highlights from this notice include:  
a. E&P-reducing transactions;  
b. The accruing of foreign income taxes between measurement 
dates; 
c. Cash measurement dates.  
 The IRS states in this notice that it intends to regulate transactions that reduce a 
shareholder’s Section 965 liability, or the reduction of an SFC’s E&P. This is known as 
the anti-avoidance rule, and three requirements must be fulfilled in order to trigger 
this rule: the transaction takes place on or after November 2, 2017,6 the primary 
                                                             
6 The IRS states that the transaction can occur wholly or in part after November 2, 2017. This means that if 
any part of the transaction takes place on or after November 2, 2017, it is eligible to trigger the anti-
avoidance rule.  
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purpose of the transaction is to reduce the shareholder’s Section 965 liability, and the 
shareholder’s Section 965 liability would be reduced due to this transaction. If the 
three requirements are satisfied, then the anti-avoidance rule states that the 
transaction is ignored when determining the Section 965 liability. The IRS details three 
categories of transactions that are speculated to be initiated with the principal 
purpose of reducing a U.S. shareholder’s Section 965 liability: pro-rata share 
transactions, E&P reduction transactions, and cash reduction transactions. A pro rata 
share transaction occurs when a U.S. shareholder receives a transfer of stock from an 
SFC with the purpose of lowering the shareholder’s Section 965 liability. E&P 
reduction transactions are transactions undertaken by an SFC that reduce its post-
1986 undistributed earnings outside of transactions that arise through the ordinary 
course of business. A cash reduction transaction is defined as the transfer of cash, 
cash equivalents, or accounts receivable by an SFC to a U.S. shareholder or relative to 
the U.S. shareholder if said transaction reduces the shareholder’s foreign cash 
position.  
 The other major element discussed in this notice is the cash measurement dates. 
The IRS spells out three cash measurement dates for SFC shareholders, stating that 
the shareholder’s total cash position is either the greater of the U.S. shareholder’s 
aggregate pro rata share of its SFCs determined on the last measurement day 
described below, or the average of the shareholder’s pro rata share of the SFC’s cash 
position of the prior two years. The last day for cash measurement is the close of the 
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taxable year ending on or after November 2, 2017 and beginning before January 1, 
2018. The first cash measurement date for the averaging method is the close of the 
last taxable year between November 1, 2015 and November 1, 2016. The second date 
for the averaging method is the close of the taxable year between November 1, 2016 
and November 2, 2017.  
3.1b (iv): Regulation 104226-18 
 The regulation, titled REG-104226-18, was released by the IRS and the Treasury 
Department on August 9, 2018. In it, the IRS confirms the guidance of the notices 
issued throughout the past year (Dabrowski et al., 2018). The notices released before 
this regulation did not change any legislation regarding the transition tax, they instead 
clarified gray areas from the original legislation. This regulation effectively enacted the 
guidance issued from the prior notices, yet did not meaningfully change the overall 
foundation of the transition tax, and the changes it enacted do not have a material 
impact for the purposes of this paper.  
3.2 Section 965 in 2004 
3.2a What was the 2004 Section 965? 
 The 2004 Section 965 was part of the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA). It 
allowed a one-time deduction in either 2004 or 2005 of 85 percent of repatriated 
foreign earnings in the form of cash dividends to U.S. parent corporations. The specific 
application of the tax is discussed below in Section 3.2c. This was back when the 
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corporate tax rate was 35 percent, so the effective tax rate that companies would be 
paying on these repatriated earnings would be 5.25 percent.7 The main reason for 
creating this deduction was that receiving tax on 15 percent of offshore earnings 
would be more tax revenue for the U.S. government than if firms continued to keep 
their foreign earnings offshore (150 Congressional Record S11017, S11038, 2004). 678 
public corporations reported positive dollar amounts of pretax income in their 2002 
financial statements which totaled to around $426 billion (Albring et. al, 2005). Of 
these 678 firms, 282 firms had a combined $318 billion of permanently reinvested 
earnings, and these 282 firms would have paid $46 billion in tax on these earnings if 
they had repatriated 100 percent of their earnings prior the creation of Section 965. 
Once Section 965 was enacted, the same firms would pay about $7 billion in taxes if 
they repatriated 100 percent of their permanently reinvested earnings. In late 2004, 
Business Week cited a J.P. Morgan survey from 2003 that states that 50 percent of the 
survey’s respondents would repatriate nearly all of their foreign earnings if the ACJA 
included Section 965, and that the bank expected approximately $300 billion to be 
repatriated in 2005 (Mehring, 2004). A response that positive would have been 
enough for Congress to include this repatriation deduction, but the legislation was set 
in motion years earlier due to strong lobbying efforts. 
3.2b Why Section 965 was Created 
                                                             
7 The effective rate of 5.25% is equal to the effective rate of 35% multiplied by (1-0.85). It was estimated 
that most firms would not have an effective tax rate as low as 5.25% due to legislation specifying that by 
taking the 85% deduction would lose any foreign tax credits on the repatriated earnings.  
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 The lobbying for a reduced tax on repatriated foreign earnings began several 
years prior to the passage of the ACJA. The effort was led by a lobbying group named 
the Homeland Investment Coalition and was unsurprisingly composed of mostly big 
pharma and tech companies, as these companies had the majority of offshore 
earnings. Their reasoning for advocating for this law, as cited by the Wall Street 
Journal, argued that, “the law would create ‘hundreds of billions of dollars in private 
investment…allowing U.S. companies to remake themselves and create new and 
better jobs within the United States” (Simpson & Zuckerman, 2004). These types of 
companies could exploit profit shifting of intangibles abroad, and were more likely to 
postpone repatriating earnings in order to avoid paying higher US income tax.  
3.2c How Section 965 was Applied  
 As stated above, the effective tax rate on these foreign earnings was 5.25 
percent. IRC Section 965(b)(1) stated that the 85 percent deduction could not exceed 
$500 million, the dollar amount of the permanently reinvested earnings disclosed in 
the U.S. parent corporation’s financial statements, or the potential tax liability of the 
company’s permanently reinvested earnings divided by 0.35.8 Section 965(c)(1) 
specifies that the most recent audited financial statements on or before June 30, 
2003, would be the financial statements used to determine the total amount eligible 
for the deduction. Notice 2005-10, released in 2005, stated that repatriated funds are 
                                                             
8 The 0.35 was due to the deferred tax liability being reported at the U.S. corporate rate of 35 percent. By 
dividing by 35 percent, the reinvested earnings would be materially understated, and would therefore 
lower the maximum potential reinvested earnings eligible for the 85 percent deduction. 
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required to be invested within the U.S. in a domestic reinvestment plan approved by 
the parent corporation’s management before fund repatriation occurred. Eligible 
investments included debt repayment, infrastructure, research and development, and 
capital investments. Stock redemptions, dividends, or executive compensation were 
not considered eligible investment programs.  
3.2d Results of the 2004 Section 965 
 Congress’ intentions for creating such a massive deduction was to bring offshore 
earnings back in to the U.S. to spur the economy, create jobs, and encourage domestic 
investment and R&D expenditures. Yet firms that repatriated their offshore earnings 
in 2004 had an increase of $60.85 billion more in share repurchases in 2005 than firms 
that did not repatriate their offshore earnings (Blouin & Krull, 2009). This result was 
the opposite of Congress’ intentions, as Congress had constricted the use of funds for 
reasons listed above. The same study found that mean quarterly dividends increased 
from $8.98 billion in 2004 to $51.28 billion in 2005, or a 471 percent increase. These 
foreign repatriations increased GDP over one percent during this period.9 A different 
study, conducted by Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes in 2010, found no evidence 
proving the increase in repatriations due to the ACJA tax holiday in 2004 had any 
effect on domestic investment, employment, or R&D in the years following the AJCA. 
However, the study did find that for every $1 repatriated, there was a $0.60-$0.92 
                                                             
9 This one percent increase is calculated by taking the total dividends from foreign subsidiaries over the 
total U.S. GDP for that year. In 2004, this was 0.31 percent of U.S. GDP, and 2005 represented 1.63 
percent of total US GDP.  
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increase in shareholder payouts (Dharmapala, Foley, & Forbes, 2010). While it can be 
argued that shareholder payouts do boost the economy, it appears that the primary 
stated intentions for the tax break, including job creation, increased R&D, and 
increased domestic investment, did not occur as planned.  
3.3 Comparing the Old with the New: How Section 965 Changed From 2004 to 2017 
 There are several similarities between the ACJA Section 965 and the TCJA Section 
965, including the factors that spurred their creation as well as the primary targets of 
the one-time tax. Yet there are many more differences between the two, as it appears 
that Congress is trying to learn from its mistakes and prevent history from repeating 
itself.  
 The economic factors that led to the creation of the Section 965s are very 
similar. In both cases, large multinational tech and pharmaceutical corporations were 
using similar profit shifting strategies by selling intangible assets abroad into low-tax 
jurisdictions, leading to massive amounts of permanently reinvested offshore earnings 
by these MNCs. Congress also had similar intentions during 2004 and 2017. In creating 
these taxes, Congress was trying to directly address these tech and pharmaceutical 
MNCs who were employing the profit shifting strategies discussed above. Congress 
also was trying to spur the US economy with these taxes through domestic 
investment, R&D expenditures, and job creation.  
 Comparing the two Section 965s creates the idea that Congress is trying to avoid 
the pitfalls of 2004 and create a better Section 965. The 2004 Section 965 was a major 
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deduction on offshore earnings, leading to a 5.25 percent effective tax rate on these 
permanently reinvested earnings. The scope of investment opportunities was limited 
for MNCs, and led to a large increase of share repurchases, which did not have the 
intended direct effect on the U.S. economy that Congress had hoped. The 2017 
Section 965 states a higher effective tax rate of eight percent on noncash assets and 
15.5 percent on cash and cash equivalents. The current transition tax also does not 
limit what corporations can do with the foreign earnings in order to encourage other 
types of direct investment in the economy. Congress also released more notices to 
clarify the various terms and phrases used in the 2017 TCJA. The newer Section 965 
takes away the choice to bring back offshore earnings, forcing firms to report all 
permanently reinvested post-1986 earnings, whereas the 2004 version allowed firms 
to choose. A final major difference is that the 2004 version required that all 
repatriations be made in cash, while the 2017 version taxes all foreign assets, cash or 
noncash, regardless of whether the firm brings the assets back into the U.S. The 2017 
version allows for other assets to be brought back, presumably to try and get firms to 
shift back the rights of intangibles back to the US to try and prevent a future build-up 
of offshore earnings from occurring.  
3.4 Section 965 Government Revenue Prediction 
3.4a Precursor to Data Analysis 
 The purpose of obtaining this data is to compare what the firms record as their 
provision for the transition tax with an estimated transition tax liability calculated by 
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using firms’ prior disclosures of total PRE and foreign cash. This comparison can show 
whether or not there is a possibility that firms are manipulating their foreign cash 
positions in order to lower their transition tax liability and bring back more offshore 
earnings without paying U.S. income tax.  
In order to estimate the transition tax revenue generated, I first collected an 
adequate sample size of firms that reported permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) on 
their 10-K financial statements in recent fiscal years, either 2016 or 2017 depending 
on which year the firm last disclosed their total PRE.  From there, I filtered the sample 
down to the firms with greater than $10 billion in PRE since these firms aggregate PRE 
accounts for 57 percent of all firms that disclose PRE on their financial statements. 
There were a total of 50 firms that reported more than $10 billion of PRE on their 
most recent financial statements.  
 For Table 1, the variables were calculated as follows. The column labeled “Total 
PRE” represents the firms’ total PRE on the measurement dates of the transition tax. 
Some of the firms PRE was given on their 10-K for fiscal year 2017. However, the 
majority of the firms selected did not list their PRE on their 2017 financial statements. 
The total PRE for these firms were calculated by taking the PRE listed on their fiscal 
year 2016 financial statements and adding the total foreign pretax income for fiscal 
year 2017, with the assumption that the firms will delay repatriation on foreign 
earnings from 2017 in order to take advantage of the discounted rate offered by the 
transition tax. Since these firms did not disclose PRE in 2017, the assumption is that 
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these firms would use the latest possible measurement date in order to capture more 
2017 foreign income as PRE. Additionally, there were 10 firms that did not end their 
fiscal year on December 31st10. The total PRE for these firms were taken from their 10-
K financial statements and could differ from the 12/31 measurement date. The next 
two columns, “Foreign Cash” and “Foreign Noncash” represent the firms’ breakdown 
of their PRE between cash and cash equivalents, and noncash assets, respectively. 
Many firms reported on their fiscal year 2017 10-K the amount of foreign cash they 
held in foreign subsidiaries, which is the amount that would be subject to the higher 
15.5 percent tax rate for the transition tax. The 2017 foreign cash amount was used 
due to all firms disclosing that they were still finalizing their calculations pertaining to 
the cash measurements. The firms did not disclose which cash calculation method 
they used between the 2017 measurement or the average between 2015 and 2016, so 
I uniformly applied the same 2017 measurement method to all firms. Eight firms did 
not disclose the amount of foreign cash held, so for these firms, foreign cash was 
calculated by taking a ratio of foreign PPE to total PPE and applying that percentage to 
the firm’s total cash and cash equivalents.11 The assumption here is that firms would 
hold foreign cash in proportion to their foreign PPE. To calculate the firms’ foreign 
noncash assets, the foreign cash was subtracted from the total PRE. The column 
labeled “Estimated Provision” is a projection of what the firms’ Section 965 tax liability 
                                                             
10 These 10 firms are: Apple Inc, Hewlett Packard Enterprise, HP Inc, Micron Technology Inc, Microsoft 
Corp, Nike Inc, Oracle Corp, Procter & Gamble Co, Walmart Inc, and Western Digital Corp. 
11 These 8 firms include: Alphabet Inc, Amgen Inc, Danaher Corp, Dowdupont Inc, Du Pont De Nemours, 
Eaton Corp PLC, Hewlett Packard Enterprise, and Pfizer Inc.  
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should be. It is calculated using the formula: (Foreign Cash) (0.155) + (Foreign 
Noncash) (0.08). Next, “Estimated Low End” and “Estimated High End” denote the 
range that the firms’ provisions should fall into, the low end calculated by assuming 
100 percent of the total PRE is noncash assets and therefore multiplied by the eight 
percent tax rate, and the high end assumes that 100 percent of total PRE is cash and 
cash equivalents, and therefore subject to the 15.5 percent rate. The column “Actual 
Provision” is taken from the firms’ most recent financial statements in which they 
disclose their estimated transition tax liability. The provision is a combination of 
current and noncurrent tax liabilities, as all the firms are electing to pay their 
transition tax liability over an eight-year period and are only listing eight percent of 
their total liability as current. The firms only list a provision and not a finalized number 
as all firms state that they are still undergoing the final calculation of their PRE cash 
and noncash assets and will be giving an exact number for their fiscal year 2018 
financial statements. Next is the column “Raw Difference” which denotes the 
difference between the firms’ estimated and actual provisions for the transition tax in 
U.S. dollars.  The final column, “Difference” is a comparison of the firms’ actual 
provisions with the estimated provision in percentage form to make easy comparisons 
between firms with varying amounts of PRE. It is effectively a comparison of the 
effective tax rate on the firms’ PRE, with the number shown is calculated by: (Actual 
Provision/PRE)- (Estimated Provision/PRE). A negative number could imply the use of 
foreign tax credits by the firms. It is difficult to measure the impact of foreign tax 
credits on this calculation, as firms with negative numbers paid foreign income tax on 
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their PRE, which would generate a specific amount of foreign tax credits that are 
eligible for use in offsetting the total transition tax liability. Since firms would 
incorporate foreign tax credits in their provisions, their U.S. transition tax liability 
would be significantly lower that the numbers in this calculation, and this calculation 
effectively ignores the effects of foreign tax credits.   
Based on the methods listed above for calculating the estimated transition tax 
liability, several firms were excluded due to complications. Six of the firms are within 
the financial services industry with focuses on banking and trading.12 These firms were 
excluded from the sample because their industry relies on the firms holding liquid 
cash reserves in their institutions worldwide, and their reserves are a key component 
of their business. Therefore, these firms did not disclose the amount of foreign cash 
held. These firms also do not own many long-lived PPE, so it would not be accurate to 
apply the foreign PPE/total PPE method to these firms. Further, an additional six firms 
were excluded from the sample due to their financial statements disclosing that the 
transition tax does not have a material impact on their financials, and therefore did 
not report a provision for their transition tax liability.13 After filtering out these firms, 
the total number of firms analyzed was thirty-seven.  
3.4b Data Analysis 
                                                             
12 These 6 firms are: American Express Co, Bank of America Corp, Goldman Sachs Group Inc, JPMorgan 
Chase & Co, Morgan Stanley, and Visa Inc. 
13 These 5 firms that decided the transition tax did not have a material impact were: Chevron Corp, Exxon 
Mobil Corp, Philip Morris International, TE Connectivity LTD, and United Technologies Corp. 
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 The average of the difference in actual and estimated effective transition tax 
rates is equal to -0.77 percent, which could imply the use of foreign tax credits. When 
excluding the unique case of Apple, which reported higher foreign cash than total PRE, 
the average difference drops to -0.95 percent.  
 From the thirty-seven firms in the sample, which are the firms with the highest 
amount of PRE, their combined transition tax liability is $172.5 billion to be paid over 
the next eight years based on the actual provisions listed by the firms. From the 
perspective of the U.S. government, this is $172.5 billion that will be available for the 
government to use in their budget. Yet for the individual firms, they are paying an 
average effective transition tax rate of 9.3 percent. If the transition tax mandated the 
firms’ PRE be taxed at the corporate 21 percent, the total tax liability would be about 
$321 billion. Under the old regime, it would have been possible for these firms to 
continue to indefinitely reinvest their offshore earnings, which would not generate 
any tax revenue for the U.S. government. This transition tax benefits the U.S. 
government, as the government receives around $300 billion14 in tax revenue that 
otherwise might not have been brought back into the country. Also, firms that have 
been permanently reinvesting earnings to delay paying U.S. income tax now get the 
opportunity to bring back these earnings at a rate lower than the old 35 percent 
corporate tax rate that the firms would have paid if they had repatriated immediately. 
                                                             
14 As mentioned above, these firms represent 57 percent of the PRE disclosed. Applying the ETR found in 
this analysis of firms’ stated provisions of 9.301 percent, the total amount of government revenue totals 
around $307.917 billion. 
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However, it is difficult to estimate the ETR if the firms repatriated under the old 
regime as the firms would have received foreign tax credits, which would lower the 
ETR below 35 percent. 
 There are several factors that may impact the results of this analysis of 
comparing actual transition tax provisions with an estimated transition tax liability 
based on the past disclosures of PRE and foreign cash. The firms that did not disclose 
their total PRE on their 2017 financial statements may have total PRE’s different from 
the total calculated in this estimation if the firms elected not to permanently reinvest 
all of their 2017 foreign pretax earnings. Also, a total of eight firms did not disclose 
their foreign cash and cash equivalents, and their calculations could differ than the 
estimation provided in this sample.  
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4. ALTERNATIVES TO THE TRANSITION TAX 
 This section will compare the tax liability calculated under the current legislation 
with alternative scenarios. The first comparison will look at what these firms would 
pay on their PRE if there were no transition tax and all PRE were eligible for the GILTI 
regime. The second area of speculation involves adding an additional tax to the assets 
that these firms elect to bring back into the United States. The third scenario 
compares how the legislation allows firms to pay off their transition tax liability in an 
eight-year phase-in plan, and speculates the total liability if the legislation detailed a 
phase-out plan. 
4.1 Scenario 1: No Transition Tax and All PRE is Eligible for GILTI 
 Scenario 1 eliminates the transition tax and instead looks at all PRE to be taxed 
under the GILTI Regime. See Table 2 for this scenario. As discussed in Section 2, the 
GILTI (Global Intangible Low-Tax Income) Regime enacts a 10.5 percent tax on the 
firms’ foreign pre-tax income in excess of ten percent of its foreign PPE. The 
calculation of the tax liability for the GILTI regime on PRE starts with looking at a firm’s 
pretax foreign income (Total PIFO) from the years 1986 until either 2016 or 2017 
depending on when the firm last disclosed their total PRE. Three firms included in the 
prior analysis are excluded because there was no data available for their PIFO,  
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including Berkshire Hathaway, Oracle Corp, and Praxair Inc.15 The difference was then 
taken between total PIFO and total PRE from the firms’ last disclosure of PRE. This 
difference is assumed to be the amount that the firms repatriated since 1986, and 
therefore would be excluded from the GILTI calculation. This estimated repatriation 
amount is excluded from PIFO ratably from 1986 until the last year the firm disclosed 
their PRE. Some firms had a negative difference, implying that their PRE was greater 
than their accumulated PIFO. For these firms, there was no adjustment made for 
repatriated earnings. The Total Foreign PPE lists the amount of foreign PPE held by the 
firm in 2017. Here it is assumed that firms held their foreign PPE constant from 1986 
to 2017, which might bias this calculation due the possibility of an increase of foreign 
PPE, likely due to inflation. The Total GILTI represents the amount of tax the firms 
would pay on their total PRE if it was taxed under the GILTI regime.16  
 Under this scenario, these firms would pay an estimated $55.206 billion on their 
total PRE. Compared to the total transition tax liability reported on the firms’ 10-Ks of 
$148.113 billion, this scenario would cost the government an additional $92.907 
billion, or a 62.7 percent decrease from the current Section 965 of the TCJA. A major 
reason for this difference is the ten percent return on foreign assets. If the GILTI 
legislation did not include this provision, the tax liability would increase to $142.454 
                                                             
15 These firms had an effective transition tax rate of eight percent, 14 percent, and four percent, and had 
PRE of $16.79 bil, $56.575 bil, and $13.284 bil, respectively, under Section 965. Together, these firms 
represented 11.7 percent of the total amount of PRE in the Section 3 analysis and will be excluded from 
comparisons in this section. 
16 This was calculated yearly with the formula .105*((PIFO- Yearly Repatriation)- (.1*Foreign PPE). 
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billion. Even then, the total tax liability under GILTI is still below the total for the 
transition tax, which shows that the actual transition tax is more effective for higher 
tax revenues than if PRE was taxed under new regime laws. Also, while this scenario 
could be plausible if this method were implemented going forward, it would be 
challenging to enact for the transition tax because it would be difficult for firms to get 
their exact numbers on their total foreign PPE dating back to 1986.  
4.2 Scenario 2: Taxing Cash and Cash Equivalents at 21 Percent U.S. 
 This scenario keeps in place the current legislation of Section 965 and raises the 
rate on cash and cash equivalents to 21 percent. The theory behind this raised cash 
tax rate lies in interviews with the CEO of Apple, Tim Cook, who in early 2018 stated 
that Apple would bring back the majority of their $252 billion in offshore cash due to 
the transition tax (Wakabayashi and Chen, 2018). Bringing back offshore cash due to 
the transition tax is a strategy that is being used by other major firms included in the 
sample, including Microsoft and Alphabet. Taxing cash assets at 21 percent would not 
be unreasonable, as that is the tax rate imposed on earnings within the U.S. under the 
new tax law, as opposed to the old corporate rate of 35 percent. Almost every firm 
included in the earlier analysis did not disclose how much they would bring back to 
the U.S., nor whether the assets would be cash or noncash. As shown in Table 3, cash 
and cash equivalents make up a slight minority of total PRE, so this raised tax rate 
would not have too much of a negative impact on firms.  
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 Table 3 lists the same variables as Table 1 but with the estimated total liability 
for the firms if their cash and cash equivalents were taxed at 21 percent as opposed to 
the current 15.5 percent. Under this assumption, there would be an extra $32.3 billion 
included in the tax liability, and $26.1 billion more than the total provisions recorded 
by the firms. This would also raise the ETR for the transition tax, as this raises the 
average ETR for firms to 13 percent. While the raised average ETR would result in 
additional revenue for the government as opposed to the current legislation, Congress 
may not have included a tax like this because they already felt like they were getting a 
major revenue boost by receiving taxes on previously untaxed earnings. Also, raising 
the effective transition tax rate could place financial strain on some of the firms 
eligible for the transition tax. The primary purpose of the TCJA act was to stimulate 
the economy and create more jobs and placing a large financial strain on firms would 
effectively do the opposite of the legislation’s main intentions.  
4.3 Scenario 3: Phase-In Versus Phase-Out 
 This scenario will explore the transition tax liability payment plan. As stated in 
Section 3, the payment plan is eight percent of the net liability in Years One through 
Five, 15 percent in Year Six, 20 percent in Year Seven, and the final 25 percent in Year 
Eight. This method of legislation is more commonly known as a phase-in plan, in which 
the preliminary years have a lighter payment that steadily increases over the years. 
This type of plan is also a strategy used to delay most of the total liability to future 
years, effectively lowering the amount owed today due to the time value of money, 
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the effect of which is shown in Table 4. Also, it creates the opportunity for future 
legislation to be passed that will further delay the payments or even remove them 
altogether. An alternative to a phase-in plan is a phase-out plan, in which the early 
years have larger percentages of the total liability, which shrinks as the years go on. 
This strategy is less applicable for the transition tax, as a phase-out plan is used on 
already-existing plans that are being discontinued in the future. A happy medium 
between these two strategies would be to have each year be equal, in this case, 12.5 
percent per year over eight years. Table 5 shows the effect of equal payment years. 
The discount rate used in either case is the 2.56 percent. This rate is used because the 
going rate on five and ten year government bonds is 2.34 percent and 2.77 percent 
respectively, and since this payment plan falls close to halfway between five and ten 
years, 2.56 percent falls close to halfway between the two going rates.  
 The effect of the current phase-in payment plan in Table 4 lowers the present 
value of the transition tax by $22.1 billion, from $172.5 billion to $150.4 billion. Using 
a ratable payment plan like in Table 5, the present value of the transition tax liability 
increases to $154.2 billion, which is a $3.8 billion increase for the U.S. government, or 
roughly a two percent increase. Two percent is significant when referring to an 
amount as large as this, and Congress should have included a ratable rather than 
phase-in payment plan in order to generate a higher NPV on the transition tax. 
However, a potential issue with the current phase-in payment plan is that at any point 
in the future, there is the possibility that a change in legislation could further delay 
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these payments. Any delay in payments would decrease the present value of the 
transition tax further. Another possibility is that due to increased lobbying efforts 
from the firms with the largest transition tax liabilities, there could be an elimination 
of the liability altogether, allowing firms to avoid paying even more income tax. These 
firms have already used lobbying to weaken U.S. international tax law, as shown in 
1997 with the passing of the check-the-box regime due to lobbying from tech and 
pharmaceutical firms. Congress may not have included this ratable payment plan due 
to lobbying efforts to try and decrease the current portion owed with the possibility of 
delaying future payments, or Congress may not have wanted to place extra financial 
strain on these firms with a 4.5 percent increase per year for the first five years.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
 Under the current legislation, the transition tax will generate an estimated 
$172.5 billion in tax revenue from the firms included in the sample. Scenario 1 shows 
that taxing all PRE under the new GILTI regime would decrease tax revenues by 62.7 
percent when compared to the current transition tax. Under Scenario 2, an increased 
cash rate to 21 percent would provide an extra $32.3 billion but may place financial 
strain on firms that would counter the rationale behind the TCJA. Scenario 3 would 
raise the present value of the transition tax liability from the sample by $4 billion, yet 
by increasing the payments for the first five years could also place firms under 
financial stress.  
 There are several shortcomings with the analyses conducted in this paper. 
Pertaining to the current legislation calculations, it is impossible to have access to the 
information available to the firms about their PRE classifications, which could skew the 
total PRE that all calculations are based off of. The lack of disclosures of foreign cash 
could also impact the total calculations, as changes in cash have a more substantial 
impact due to the higher rate imposed on cash. Also, it is extremely difficult to analyze 
the impact of foreign tax credits in the overall calculation. The total PRE, which has 
not been taxed under U.S. law but has been taxed under some foreign jurisdictions, 
has created unused foreign tax credits. Since the firms did not disclose the effects of 
foreign tax credits on their provisions, the total effect of these foreign tax credits will 
be unknown until firms declare their total transition tax liability, which could further 
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decrease the transition tax revenues. With regards to the alternate scenarios, several 
assumptions lead to possible shortcomings. Under Scenario 1, applying a constant 
foreign PPE from 2017 back to 1986 understates the GILTI tax owed in earlier years 
due to firm growth and inflation. Scenario 2 assumes that all foreign cash will be 
brought back to the US, and as explained earlier, the total foreign cash held by some 
firms was an estimated amount. 
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Table 1: Estimated Transition Tax Liability vs. Actual Provision for the Transition Tax 
Firm  Total PRE  Foreign 
Cash  
Foreign  
Noncash 
Estimated 
Provision  
Estimated  
Low End  
Estimated  
High End  
Actual 
Provision  
Raw 
Difference 
Diff.  
3M CO‡  
      
15,000.00  3,975.00  
     
11,025.00  
        
1,498.13  
        
1,200.00  
        
2,325.00  
             
745.00  
           
(753.13) 
 
(5.02%) 
ABBOTT 
LABORATORIES  
         
25,923.00  
        
3,300.00  
     
22,623.00  
        
2,321.34  
        
2,073.84  
        
4,018.07  
        
2,890.00  
             
568.66  
 
2.19%  
ABBVIE INC  
         
39,405.00  
        
2,200.00  
     
37,205.00  
        
3,317.40  
        
3,152.40  
        
6,107.78  
        
4,500.00  
        
1,182.60  
 
3.00%  
ALPHABET INC†  
         
72,100.00  
        
6,604.00  
     
65,496.00  
        
6,263.30  
        
5,768.00  
     
11,175.50  
     
10,200.00  
        
3,936.70  
 
5.46%  
AMGEN INC†  
         
41,761.00  
        
9,298.00  
     
32,463.00  
        
4,038.23  
        
3,340.88  
        
6,472.96  
        
7,300.00  
        
3,261.77  
 
7.81%  
APPLE INC*  
      
173,400.00  
  
252,300.00  
   
(78,900.00) 
     
32,794.50  
     
13,872.00  
     
26,877.00  
     
42,200.00  
        
9,405.50  
 
5.42%  
BERKSHIRE 
HATHAWAY  
         
16,790.00  
     
12,650.00  
        
4,140.00  
        
2,291.95  
        
1,343.20  
        
2,602.45  
        
1,400.00  
           
(891.95) (5.31%) 
BOOKING 
HOLDINGS INC  
         
16,500.00  
        
6,700.00  
        
9,800.00  
        
1,822.50  
        
1,320.00  
        
2,557.50  
        
1,600.00  
           
(222.50) (1.35%) 
BRISTOL-MYERS 
SQUIBB CO  
         
28,551.00  
        
5,200.00  
     
23,351.00  
        
2,674.08  
        
2,284.08  
        
4,425.41  
        
2,600.00  
              
(74.08) (0.26%) 
CATERPILLAR 
INC  
      
19,842.00      7,500.00    12,342.00       2,149.86       1,587.36  
        
3,075.51       1,775.00  
        
(374.86) (1.89%  
CELGENE CORP  
         
17,169.00  
        
6,000.00  
     
11,169.00  
        
1,823.52  
        
1,373.52  
        
2,661.20  
        
1,890.00  
                
66.48  
 
0.39%  
COCA-COLA CO  
         
42,000.00  
     
19,600.00  
     
22,400.00  
        
4,830.00  
        
3,360.00  
        
6,510.00  
        
4,600.00  
           
(230.00) (0.55%) 
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CORNING INC‡  
         
16,900.00  
        
2,800.00  
     
14,100.00  
        
1,562.00  
        
1,352.00  
        
2,619.50  
        
1,100.00  
           
(462.00) (2.73%) 
DANAHER 
CORP†  
         
25,011.60  
        
1,249.00  
     
23,762.60  
        
2,094.60  
        
2,000.93  
        
3,876.80  
        
1,200.00  
           
(894.60) (3.58%) 
DOWDUPONT 
INC†‡  
         
22,460.00  
     
12,177.00  
     
10,283.00  
        
2,710.08  
        
1,796.80  
        
3,481.30  
        
1,580.00  
      
(1,130.08) (5.03%) 
DU PONT (E I) DE 
NEMOURS†  
         
16,605.00  
        
3,118.00  
     
13,487.00  
        
1,562.25  
        
1,328.40  
        
2,573.78  
             
715.00  
           
(847.25) 
 
(5.10%) 
EATON CORP 
PLC†‡  
         
22,100.00  
             
493.00  
     
21,607.00  
        
1,804.98  
        
1,768.00  
        
3,425.50  
                
17.00  
      
(1,787.98) (8.09%) 
GENERAL 
ELECTRIC CO  
         
90,443.00  
     
29,600.00  
     
60,843.00  
        
9,455.44  
        
7,235.44  
     
14,018.67  
        
1,155.00  
      
(8,300.44) (9.18%) 
GILEAD 
SCIENCES INC  
         
43,030.00  
     
31,500.00  
     
11,530.00  
        
5,804.90  
        
3,442.40  
        
6,669.65  
        
5,800.00  
                 
(4.90) (0.01%) 
HEWLETT 
PACKARD 
ENTERPRISE†  
         
13,370.00  
        
5,512.00  
        
7,858.00  
        
1,483.00  
        
1,069.60  
        
2,072.35  
        
1,100.00  
           
(383.00) (2.86%) 
HONEYWELL 
INTERNATIONAL 
INC  
         
20,000.00  
        
7,000.00  
     
13,000.00  
        
2,125.00  
        
1,600.00  
        
3,100.00  
        
1,900.00  
           
(225.00) (1.13%) 
HP INC  
         
24,990.00  
        
3,770.00  
     
21,220.00  
        
2,281.95  
        
1,999.20  
        
3,873.45  
        
3,100.00  
             
818.05  3.27%  
INTEL CORP  
         
55,611.00  
        
8,400.00  
     
47,211.00  
        
5,078.88  
        
4,448.88  
        
8,619.71  
        
6,100.00  
        
1,021.12  1.84%  
LILLY (ELI) & CO  
         
28,969.00  
        
3,100.00  
     
25,869.00  
        
2,550.02  
        
2,317.52  
        
4,490.20  
        
3,600.00  
        
1,049.98  3.62%  
MCDONALD'S 
CORP  
         
22,331.50  
        
1,500.00  
     
20,831.50  
        
1,899.02  
        
1,786.52  
        
3,461.38  
        
1,200.00  
           
(699.02) (3.13%) 
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MERCK & CO  
         
66,138.00  
        
8,500.00  
     
57,638.00  
        
5,928.54  
        
5,291.04  
     
10,251.39  
        
5,300.00  
           
(628.54) (0.95%) 
MICRON 
TECHNOLOGY 
INC  
         
27,076.00  
        
1,710.00  
     
25,366.00  
        
2,294.33  
        
2,166.08  
        
4,196.78  
        
1,049.00  
      
(1,245.33) (4.60%) 
MICROSOFT 
CORP  
      
166,947.00  
     
59,000.00  
  
107,947.00  
     
17,780.76  
     
13,355.76  
     
25,876.79  
     
17,900.00  
             
119.24  0.07%  
NIKE INC  
         
15,781.00  
        
2,500.00  
     
13,281.00  
        
1,449.98  
        
1,262.48  
        
2,446.06  
        
2,010.00  
             
560.02  3.55%  
ORACLE CORP  
         
56,575.00  
     
21,700.00  
     
34,875.00  
        
6,153.50  
        
4,526.00  
        
8,769.13  
        
7,800.00  
        
1,646.50  2.91%  
PEPSICO INC  
         
51,050.00  
     
18,900.00  
     
32,150.00  
        
5,501.50  
        
4,084.00  
        
7,912.75  
        
4,000.00  
      
(1,501.50) (2.94%) 
PFIZER INC†  
      
105,184.00  
        
9,992.00  
     
95,192.00  
        
9,164.12  
        
8,414.72  
     
16,303.52  
     
15,200.00  
        
6,035.88  5.74%  
PRAXAIR INC  
         
13,284.00  
        
1,200.00  
     
12,084.00  
        
1,152.72  
        
1,062.72  
        
2,059.02  
             
467.00  
           
(685.72) (5.16%) 
PROCTER & 
GAMBLE CO  
         
53,049.00  
     
11,400.00  
     
41,649.00  
        
5,098.92  
        
4,243.92  
        
8,222.60  
        
3,800.00  
      
(1,298.92) (2.45%) 
THERMO FISHER 
SCIENTIFIC INC‡  
         
13,210.00  
        
1,185.00  
     
12,025.00  
        
1,145.68  
        
1,056.80  
        
2,047.55  
        
1,250.00  
             
104.33  0.79%  
WALMART INC  
         
31,001.00  
        
1,400.00  
     
29,601.00  
        
2,585.08  
        
2,480.08  
        
4,805.16  
        
1,900.00  
           
(685.08) (2.21%) 
WESTERN 
DIGITAL CORP  
         
18,398.00  
        
4,150.00  
     
14,248.00  
        
1,783.09  
        
1,471.84  
        
2,851.69  
        
1,570.00  
           
(213.09) (1.16%) 
TOTAL 
  
1,527,955.10  
  
587,183.00  
  
940,772.10  
  
166,275.13  
  
122,236.41  
  
236,833.04  
  
172,513.00  
        
6,237.87  (0.77%) 
All numbers are in millions of US dollars  
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†Represents firms that did not disclose cash held by foreign subsidiaries, and their Foreign Cash is calculated by taking (Foreign 
PPE/Total PPE) multiplied by the firm’s Cash and Cash Equivalents  
‡These firms are firms that listed their total PRE in their fiscal year 10-K.  
*Apple is a unique case, in which they disclose on their fiscal year 2017 10-K that their total PRE is $173.4 billion, but within the 
same financial statements state that their Cash and Cash equivalents held in foreign subsidiaries totals $252.3 billion.  
 
Average ETR: 9.301% 
Average ETR without Apple: 8.884% 
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Table 2: Taxing all PRE under the GILTI Regime 
Firm Years with PRE 
 (Total Years) Total PIFO 
PRE From 
File Date 
Total 
Foreign 
PPE 
Total 
GILTI  
Actual 
Provision 
3M CO 1986-2017 (32) 56,468.00 15,000.00 3,975.00 239.40 745.00 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES 1986-2016 (31) 60,247.96 25,923.00 8,900.00 -175.04 2,890.00 
ABBVIE INC 2010-2016 (7) 41,914.00 39,405.00 941.00 4,068.36 4,500.00 
ALPHABET INC 2004-2016 (13) 75,986.60 72,100.00 14,706.00 5,563.13 10,200.00 
AMGEN INC* 2003-2016 (14) 40,589.00 41,761.00 2,640.00 3,873.77 7,300.00 
APPLE INC 1986-2016 (31) 248,725.00 173,400.00 17,341.00 12,562.50 42,200.00 
BOOKING HOLDINGS INC* 2003-04, 2006-16 (13) 14,144.13 16,500.00 462.00 1,422.07 1,600.00 
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO 1986-2016 (31) 65,687.80 28,551.00 1,384.00 2,547.36 2,600.00 
CATERPILLAR INC 1986-2016 (31) 39,683.00 19,842.00 6,029.00 120.97 1,775.00 
CELGENE CORP* 2005-2016 (12) 10,050.97 17,169.00 302.00 1,017.30 1,890.00 
COCA-COLA CO 1986-88, 1990-2016 (30) 128,917.05 42,000.00 4,040.00 3,137.40 4,600.00 
CORNING INC* 1986-2017 (32) 14,636.90 16,900.00 11,452.00 -2,311.00 1,100.00 
DANAHER CORP* 1986, 2011-16 (7) 10,722.48 25,011.60 1,328.40 1,028.22 1,200.00 
DOWDUPONT INC 1986-2017 (32) 64,029.00 22,460.00 12,973.00 -2,000.63 1,580.00 
DU PONT (E I) DE NEMOURS 1986-2016 (31) 54,246.00 16,605.00 4,727.00 204.89 715.00 
EATON CORP PLC 1986-2017 (32) 24,492.90 22,100.00 1,630.00 1,772.82 17.00 
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 1986-2016 (31) 198,245.00 90,443.00 36,231.00 -2,296.68 1,155.00 
GILEAD SCIENCES INC* 1999-2016 (18) 39,363.50 43,030.00 520.00 4,034.89 5,800.00 
HEWLETT PACKARD 
ENTERPRISE* 2013-17 (5) 10,177.00 13,370.00 3,596.00 879.80 1,100.00 
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL 
INC 1986-2016 (31) 28,799.00 20,000.00 2,322.00 1,344.19 1,900.00 
HP INC 1986-2017 (32) 89,973.00 24,990.00 1,012.00 2,283.92 3,100.00 
INTEL CORP 1986-2016 (31) 72,074.94 55,611.00 16,650.00 419.58 6,100.00 
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LILLY (ELI) & CO 1986-97, 2003-13 (23) 36,336.63 28,969.00 4,467.00 1,962.96 3,600.00 
MCDONALD'S CORP 1986-2016 (31) 62,533.91 22,331.50 14,855.50 -2,490.66 1,200.00 
MERCK & CO* 1986-93, 2006-16 (19) 50,861.20 66,138.00 4,369.00 4,468.81 5,300.00 
MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC* 2004-17, (14) 2,753.70 27,076.00 18,559.00 -2,439.03 1,049.00 
MICROSOFT CORP 1987-2017 (31) 219,831.77 166,947.00 35,381.00 6,012.92 17,900.00 
NIKE INC 1986-2016 (31) 29,268.29 15,781.00 3,606.00 483.25 2,010.00 
PEPSICO INC 1986-2016 (31) 70,090.00 51,050.00 19,446.00 -969.42 4,000.00 
PFIZER INC 1986-2016 (31) 210,481.00 105,184.00 6,894.00 8,800.32 15,200.00 
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 1986-2017 (32) 95,529.00 53,049.00 10,900.00 1,907.75 3,800.00 
THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC 
INC* 1986-2017 (32) 9,056.59 13,210.00 1,698.00 380.41 1,250.00 
WALMART INC 1999-2016 (18) 67,925.00 31,001.00 33,340.00 -3,046.16 1,900.00 
WESTERN DIGITAL CORP* 1987-99, 2004-17 (27) 11,609.46 18,398.00 1,908.00 678.07 1,570.00 
TOTAL   2,255,449.76 1,441,306.10 308,584.90 55,486.46 162,846.00 
All numbers in millions of US Dollars 
*Represents firms with more PRE than aggregate PIFO, and therefore do not have any repatriated amounts included in their GILTI 
tax liability 
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Table 3: Taxing all Foreign Cash Assets at 21% 
Firm Total PRE Foreign 
Cash 
Foreign 
Noncash 
Est. Liability 
Under 965 
Actual 
Provision 
965 Liability 
with 21% 
Cash Rate 
3M CO       15,000.00        3,975.00       11,025.00          1,498.13           745.00          1,716.75  
ABBOTT LABORATORIES       25,923.00        3,300.00       22,623.00          2,321.34        2,890.00          2,502.84  
ABBVIE INC       39,405.00        2,200.00       37,205.00          3,317.40        4,500.00          3,438.40  
ALPHABET INC       72,100.00        6,604.00       65,496.00          6,263.30     10,200.00          6,626.52  
AMGEN INC       41,761.00        9,298.00       32,463.00          4,038.23        7,300.00          4,549.62  
APPLE INC    173,400.00    252,300.00     (78,900.00)      32,794.50     42,200.00       46,671.00  
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY       16,790.00     12,650.00          4,140.00          2,291.95        1,400.00          2,987.70  
BOOKING HOLDINGS INC       16,500.00        6,700.00          9,800.00          1,822.50        1,600.00          2,191.00  
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO       28,551.00        5,200.00       23,351.00          2,674.08        2,600.00          2,960.08  
CATERPILLAR INC       19,842.00        7,500.00       12,342.00          2,149.86        1,775.00          2,562.36  
CELGENE CORP       17,169.00        6,000.00       11,169.00          1,823.52        1,890.00          2,153.52  
COCA-COLA CO       42,000.00     19,600.00       22,400.00          4,830.00        4,600.00          5,908.00  
CORNING INC       16,900.00       2,800.00       14,100.00          1,562.00        1,100.00          1,716.00  
DANAHER CORP       25,011.60        1,249.00       23,762.60          2,094.60        1,200.00          2,163.30  
DOWDUPONT INC       22,460.00     12,177.00       10,283.00          2,710.08        1,580.00          3,379.81  
DU PONT (E I) DE NEMOURS       16,605.00        3,118.00       13,487.00          1,562.25           715.00          1,733.74  
EATON CORP PLC       22,100.00            493.00       21,607.00          1,804.98             17.00          1,832.09  
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO       90,443.00     29,600.00       60,843.00          9,455.44        1,155.00       11,083.44  
GILEAD SCIENCES INC       43,030.00     31,500.00       11,530.00          5,804.90        5,800.00          7,537.40  
HEWLETT PACKARD 
ENTERPRISE 
     13,370.00        5,512.00          7,858.00          1,483.00        1,100.00          1,786.16  
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL 
INC 
      20,000.00        7,000.00       13,000.00          2,125.00        1,900.00          2,510.00  
HP INC      24,990.00        3,770.00       21,220.00          2,281.95        3,100.00          2,489.30  
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INTEL CORP       55,611.00        8,400.00       47,211.00          5,078.88        6,100.00          5,540.88  
LILLY (ELI) & CO       28,969.00       3,100.00       25,869.00          2,550.02        3,600.00          2,720.52  
MCDONALD'S CORP       22,331.50        1,500.00       20,831.50          1,899.02      1,200.00          1,981.52  
MERCK & CO       66,138.00        8,500.00       57,638.00          5,928.54        5,300.00          6,396.04  
MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC       27,076.00        1,710.00       25,366.00          2,294.33        1,049.00          2,388.38  
MICROSOFT CORP    166,947.00     59,000.00    107,947.00       17,780.76     17,900.00       21,025.76  
NIKE INC       15,781.00       2,500.00       13,281.00          1,449.98        2,010.00          1,587.48  
ORACLE CORP       56,575.00     21,700.00       34,875.00          6,153.50        7,800.00          7,347.00  
PEPSICO INC       51,050.00     18,900.00       32,150.00          5,501.50        4,000.00          6,541.00  
PFIZER INC     105,184.00        9,992.00       95,192.00          9,164.12     15,200.00          9,713.68  
PRAXAIR INC       13,284.00        1,200.00       12,084.00          1,152.72           467.00          1,218.72  
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO       53,049.00     11,400.00       41,649.00          5,098.92        3,800.00          5,725.92  
THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC       13,210.00        1,185.00       12,025.00          1,145.68        1,250.00          1,210.85  
WALMART INC       31,001.00        1,400.00       29,601.00          2,585.08        1,900.00          2,662.08  
WESTERN DIGITAL CORP       18,398.00        4,150.00       14,248.00          1,783.09        1,570.00          2,011.34  
TOTAL  1,527,955.10    587,183.00    940,772.10    166,275.13   172,513.00    198,570.20  
All numbers in millions of US Dollars 
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Table 4: NPV of Transition Tax Liability Under Current Phase-In Payment Plan 
Firm Provision Years 1-5 Liab. Year 6 Liab. Year 7 
Liab. 
Year 8 Liab. Net 
Present 
Value 
3M CO            745.00                 59.60             111.75          149.00           186.25           649.59  
ABBOTT LABORATORIES         2,890.00              231.20             433.50          578.00           722.50       2,519.90  
ABBVIE INC         4,500.00              360.00             675.00          900.00       1,125.00       3,923.72  
ALPHABET INC      10,200.00              816.00          1,530.00      2,040.00       2,550.00       8,893.77  
AMGEN INC         7,300.00              584.00          1,095.00       1,460.00       1,825.00       6,365.15  
APPLE INC      42,200.00          3,376.00          6,330.00       8,440.00     10,550.00     36,795.78  
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY         1,400.00              112.00             210.00          280.00           350.00       1,220.71  
BOOKING HOLDINGS INC         1,600.00              128.00             240.00          320.00           400.00       1,395.10  
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO         2,600.00              208.00             390.00          520.00           650.00       2,267.04  
CATERPILLAR INC         1,775.00              142.00             266.25          355.00           443.75       1,547.69  
CELGENE CORP         1,890.00              151.20             283.50          378.00           472.50       1,647.96  
COCA-COLA CO         4,600.00              368.00             690.00          920.00      1,150.00       4,010.91  
CORNING INC         1,100.00                 88.00             165.00          220.00           275.00           959.13  
DANAHER CORP         1,200.00                 96.00             180.00         240.00           300.00       1,046.33  
DOWDUPONT INC         1,580.00              126.40             237.00          316.00           395.00       1,377.66  
DU PONT (E I) DE NEMOURS            715.00                 57.20             107.25          143.00          178.75           623.44  
EATON CORP PLC              17.00                    1.36                 2.55              3.40               4.25             14.82  
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO         1,155.00                 92.40             173.25          231.00          288.75       1,007.09  
GILEAD SCIENCES INC         5,800.00              464.00             870.00      1,160.00       1,450.00       5,057.24  
HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE         1,100.00                 88.00             165.00          220.00          275.00           959.13  
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC         1,900.00              152.00             285.00          380.00          475.00       1,656.68  
HP INC         3,100.00              248.00             465.00          620.00          775.00       2,703.01  
INTEL CORP         6,100.00              488.00             915.00      1,220.00       1,525.00       5,318.82  
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LILLY (ELI) & CO         3,600.00              288.00             540.00          720.00           900.00       3,138.98  
MCDONALD'S CORP         1,200.00                 96.00             180.00          240.00          300.00       1,046.33  
MERCK & CO         5,300.00              424.00             795.00       1,060.00       1,325.00       4,621.27  
MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC         1,049.00                 83.92             157.35          209.80          262.25           914.66  
MICROSOFT CORP      17,900.00          1,432.00          2,685.00      3,580.00       4,475.00     15,607.69  
NIKE INC         2,010.00              160.80             301.50          402.00          502.50       1,752.60  
ORACLE CORP         7,800.00              624.00          1,170.00     1,560.00       1,950.00      6,801.12  
PEPSICO INC         4,000.00              320.00             600.00          800.00       1,000.00       3,487.75  
PFIZER INC      15,200.00          1,216.00          2,280.00       3,040.00     3,800.00     13,253.46  
PRAXAIR INC            467.00                 37.36               70.05           93.40           116.75           407.19  
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO         3,800.00              304.00             570.00          760.00           950.00       3,313.36  
THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC INC         1,250.00              100.00             187.50          250.00           312.50       1,089.92  
WALMART INC         1,900.00              152.00             285.00          380.00           475.00       1,656.68  
WESTERN DIGITAL CORP         1,570.00              125.60             235.50          314.00           392.50       1,368.94  
TOTAL   172,513.00       13,801.04       25,876.95    34,502.60     43,128.25   150,420.61  
All numbers in millions of US Dollars 
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Table 5: NPV of Transition Tax Liability Under Ratable Payment Plan 
Firm Provision 
Per-Year Liability at 
12.5% 
NPV of 
Liability 
3M CO        745.00                 93.13              666.01  
ABBOTT LABORATORIES     2,890.00              361.25          2,583.60  
ABBVIE INC     4,500.00              562.50          4,022.90  
ALPHABET INC   10,200.00          1,275.00          9,118.58  
AMGEN INC     7,300.00              912.50          6,526.04  
APPLE INC   42,200.00          5,275.00       37,725.90  
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY     1,400.00              175.00          1,251.57  
BOOKING HOLDINGS INC     1,600.00              200.00          1,430.37  
BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO     2,600.00              325.00          2,324.34  
CATERPILLAR INC     1,775.00              221.88          1,586.81  
CELGENE CORP     1,890.00              236.25          1,689.62  
COCA-COLA CO     4,600.00              575.00          4,112.30  
CORNING INC     1,100.00              137.50              983.38  
DANAHER CORP     1,200.00              150.00          1,072.77  
DOWDUPONT INC     1,580.00              197.50          1,412.49  
DU PONT (E I) DE NEMOURS        715.00                 89.38              639.19  
EATON CORP PLC           17.00                    2.13                15.20  
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO     1,155.00              144.38          1,032.55  
GILEAD SCIENCES INC     5,800.00              725.00          5,185.08  
HEWLETT PACKARD 
ENTERPRISE 
    1,100.00              137.50              983.38  
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL 
INC 
    1,900.00              237.50          1,698.56  
HP INC     3,100.00              387.50          2,771.33  
INTEL CORP     6,100.00              762.50          5,453.27  
LILLY (ELI) & CO     3,600.00              450.00          3,218.32  
MCDONALD'S CORP     1,200.00              150.00          1,072.77  
MERCK & CO     5,300.00              662.50          4,738.09  
MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC     1,049.00              131.13              937.78  
MICROSOFT CORP   17,900.00          2,237.50       16,002.22  
NIKE INC     2,010.00              251.25          1,796.90  
ORACLE CORP     7,800.00              975.00          6,973.03  
PEPSICO INC     4,000.00              500.00          3,575.91  
PFIZER INC   15,200.00          1,900.00       13,588.47  
PRAXAIR INC        467.00                 58.38              417.49  
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO     3,800.00              475.00          3,397.12  
THERMO FISHER SCIENTIFIC 
INC 
    1,250.00              156.25          1,117.47  
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WALMART INC     1,900.00              237.50          1,698.56  
WESTERN DIGITAL CORP     1,570.00              196.25          1,403.55  
TOTAL 172,513.00       21,564.13    154,222.93  
All amounts in millions of US Dollars 
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